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Abstract 
Social inequality in resource-dependent regions is a growing problem. Increasingly 
both state and private actors are acting as meta-governors to address the issue. In this 
paper, we focus on housing inequality as ‘the canary in the coalmine’ for broader 
social inequality. While affordable housing has been the subject of growing attention 
in urban scholarship, relatively few studies have considered the governance of 
affordable housing in rural regions. We report on a case analysis of affordable 
housing governance in the Gladstone-Surat Region, a traditional agricultural area of 
Australia that has experienced a dramatic increase in housing inequality due to 
significant coal seam gas development in recent years. We show that networked 
arrangements for affordable housing delivery were the product of strategic policy 
structuring, resourcing, and hands-off framing by the state government. Private meta-
governance was exercised only in relation to process management forms of meta-
governance, with private companies facilitating local ‘arenas’ for stakeholder 
discussion and connecting stakeholders in a synergistic manner. The dynamics of the 
case study examined demonstrate that meta-governance in rural regions is not just 
about coordinating and mobilising horizontal (e.g. regional) cooperation, but about 
coalescing action within multiscale ‘exogenous’ networks and structures. These 
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Abstract  
Social inequality in resource-dependent regions is a growing problem. Increasingly both state 
and private actors are acting as meta-governors to address the issue. In this paper, we focus 
on housing inequality as ‘the canary in the coalmine’ for broader social inequality. While 
affordable housing has been the subject of growing attention in urban scholarship, relatively 
few studies have considered the governance of affordable housing in rural regions. We report 
on a case analysis of affordable housing governance in the Gladstone-Surat Region, a 
traditional agricultural area of Australia that has experienced a dramatic increase in housing 
inequality due to significant coal seam gas development in recent years. We show that 
networked arrangements for affordable housing delivery were the product of strategic policy 
structuring, resourcing, and hands-off framing by the state government. Private meta-
governance was exercised only in relation to process management forms of meta-governance, 
with private companies facilitating local ‘arenas’ for stakeholder discussion and connecting 
stakeholders in a synergistic manner. The dynamics of the case study examined demonstrate 
that meta-governance in rural regions is not just about coordinating and mobilising horizontal 
(e.g. regional) cooperation, but about coalescing action within multi-scale ‘exogenous’ 
networks and structures. These findings have important implications for future efforts to 
address social inequality in rural areas.  
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
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There has been considerable documentation of the impacts of the extractive resources 
industry on rural housing markets (Wilson et al. 2016; Chapman et al. 2015; Ennis et al. 
2013; Haslam McKenzie, 2013; Haslam McKenzie and Rowley 2013; Haslam McKenzie et 
al. 2009). Most observers identify that population growth associated with the influx of 
transient workforces tends to outstrip the capacity of housing and accommodation services 
available in low population rural markets. Unintended consequences include soaring property 
values and rents, reduced affordability of housing infrastructure, and the displacement of 
long-term local residents, particularly those on fixed incomes who do not directly work in the 
industry. With the growing incursion of large-scale coal mining and coal seam gas (CSG) 
projects across non-metropolitan Australia, rural governance scholars and policy makers have 
shifted their attention to improving the assessment and management of the extractive 
industries’ impact on housing in rural regions (HoRSCRA 2013; Everingham 2012; Haslam 
McKenzie et al. 2009). A recurring theme is the need for greater co-ordination between 
extractive resource companies, communities and all levels of government in addressing 
sustained housing pressures. Responses to the management of housing inequality issues in 
‘resource-boom’ towns thus reflect broader trends in mainstream housing policy, with 
scholars in the field having charted the increasing institutionalisation of a range of private and 
not-for-profit entities in social and affordable housing provision (Muir and Mullins 2015; 
Gilmour and Milligan, 2012). Fewer studies recognise housing as integral to rural 
restructuring and rural development (Gkartzios and Scott 2014). Central state restructuring of 
social and affordable housing provision has been the subject of growing attention in urban 
studies, however relatively few have considered the impact of changes in affordable housing 
policy and governance on local housing outcomes in rural spaces (for exceptions, see: Gallent 
2009a and 2009b; Milbourne 1998). 
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In this vein, several commentators of rural governance have argued that multi-sector 
governance arrangements in rural regions are only a ‘partial governance solution’ because 
there remains a need for mobilisation and co-ordination of the various actors involved 
(Everingham 2012, p. 597; Morrison et al. 2015; Shucksmith 2010). This reflects growing 
accord within public administration literature that successful decentralisation occurs only in 
the shadow of a strong central state, a process that Jessop (1997) terms ‘meta-governance’. 
This role is not limited to the state, with more recent conceptualisations of meta-governance, 
or the ‘regulation of self-regulation’, calling for explicit analysis of the ways in which actors 
endeavour to ‘combine, facilitate, shape and direct particular forms of governance’ in order to 
steer the choices and interactions of individuals within decision making situations (Sørensen 
and Torfing 2009, p. 245). Some scholars have responded by focusing on the importance of 
state government in conflict resolution and overall policy coordination (Askland et al. 2016; 
Morrison et al. 2012). Others have highlighted the ‘default’ meta-governing role of local 
governments due to an institutional void in rural areas (Cheshire et al. 2014).  More recently, 
an emergent body of work explores the potential for non-state actors (e.g. a private 
entrepreneur, or a regional community group or advocacy group) to play the role of ‘meta-
governor’ (Wilson et al. 2016). Yet, despite the expansion of a critical literature on meta-
governance in extractive resource regions, examination of this issue with respect to 
governance of rural housing inequalities remains under-investigated.    
In this paper, we respond to the gaps identified above by exploring operations of both 
state and private actors as meta-governors in emerging models of governance addressing 
housing inequalities in extractive resource regions. We analyse multi-sectoral governance 
arrangements targeting affordable housing provision in rural communities impacted by 
unconventional CSG development in the state of Queensland, Australia. Analytically, the 
paper is concerned with understanding the role individual actors play in the formation and 
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coordination of multi-sectoral arrangements, with particular attention to the way in which 
both government and private extractive resource companies can steer cross-sector 
interactions. We ask: How do extractive resource companies help steer and coordinate the 
governance response to affordable housing impacts? Does this role differ from that of 
government, and with what consequence for governance relations? And finally, what wider 
implications does meta-governance have for affordable housing provision in rural areas? We 
ask this latter question with a view to informing the debate on the nature and results of policy 
shifts in rural housing policy towards ‘hybrid’ governance arrangements (Blessing 2012, p. 
190). 
We find that private extractive resource companies are able to undertake ‘facilitative’ 
meta-governance, a positive coordinating action involving the linkage of specific 
stakeholders and the promotion of conditions favourable to positive deliberative interaction 
as policy is formulated and implemented in affected communities. However, a core 
foundation of this deliberative action involves the activation of extractive resource 
companies, along with a range of ‘urban’ actors, as central participants in the governance of 
affordable housing by state government. This new perspective challenges recent 
understandings on the coordination of governance for responding to the social impacts of 
resource extraction by suggesting state government retains a central (if somewhat selective) 
role in such network cooperative settings. We conclude with the observation that these 
findings imply potential for better resourcing of affordable housing delivery in rural areas, 
but caution this may only be the case where stakes are high for the state and private sector.  
 
2. Understanding meta-governance: theory and framework 
Analysts now universally recognise that society is governed by a combination of state and 
non-state actors, rather than through the direct exercise of hierarchical powers by the state 
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(Rhodes 1997). In this situation, centrally directed action or market governance alone cannot 
explain policymaking and other governance functions (Borzel 1998). Rather a situation of 
network governance occurs, in which many separate, but interdependent, organisations 
interact and self-govern their actions through collective resources and interests (Rhodes 
1997). Under these conditions of increased complexity and plurality, the diffusion of 
governing capacity to networks of public and private actors is accordingly necessary to 
improve the governability of ‘wicked’ problems that now characterise postmodern society 
(Sørensen and Torfing 2005).  
Networks, however, are not a panacea for problems of decision-making and 
management of public policy (Sørensen 2007). Due to their autonomous, institution-like 
dynamic, networks face inherent difficulties with conflict and coordination (Peters 2009, pp. 
40-43). Scharpf (1988), for example, points to problems of collective action as a constraint of 
networks, highlighting that the high transaction costs of networking place networks at risk of 
falling into the ‘joint decision trap’ and reaching a stalemate, while Agranoff and McGuire 
(2003, p. 191) warn that that ‘there is nothing particularly efficient about making decisions 
jointly’. Hence, networks themselves create a problematic situation. On the one hand, they 
perform functions necessary to overcome the weaknesses of bargaining or centralised, top-
down systems, yet conversely, they are unable to replace these formal institutions due to their 
own limitations (Borzel 1998, p. 263).  
In light of these deficiencies, the success of network governance is recognised to be 
largely dependent upon the form and functioning of the relations between different 
organisations of the network (Haveri et al. 2009). Ideally, negotiated interaction must be 
relatively smooth, free from conflict and power struggles, and based on continuous 
coordination among all relevant and affected actors (Sørensen and Torfing 2005). Meta-
governance in this respect is about improving the functioning of self-governing networks. 
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According to Sørensen and Torfing (2009), it is a reflexive, higher-order process involving 
choice among different mechanisms in order to steer and facilitate particular forms of 
network governance with the intent of preventing dysfunctions or advancing particular goals. 
Meta-governance theory consequently views networks as the product of conscious 
arrangement and influence (Keast et al. 2014). Due to the self-governing character of 
governance networks, however, this influence cannot be exercised by hierarchical, top-down 
rule. Governance researchers instead point to a number of alternative, more subtle, ways in 
which networks can be meta-governed (Whitehead 2003; Sørensen 2006) (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Six forms of meta-governance explored in the case study. 
<INSERT TABLE 1> 
 
The first form of meta-governance is institutional design involving the establishment 
of, or changes to, the strategic design of the governance network to ensure the right actors are 
suitably enabled (Sørensen 2006). We identify four strategies to influence institutional 
design: institutional structuring, framing, selective activation and resourcing, which are 
indirect ways to influence the norms, purpose, identity, composition and resources of the 
governance network. Institutional structuring refers to the formal institutional set up (e.g. 
rules and procedures) of the governance arena (Sørensen and Torfing 2007). Strategies aimed 
at structuring the network, include influencing the operating rules, objectives, and the norms 
of the network. Framing, in contrast, contributes to institutional design by forming a coherent 
identity among the participating actors (March and Olsen 1995), and involves attempts to 
shape their perceptions regarding the nature and purpose of the network. It represents a 
powerful means to unify self-governing actors and their strategies for problem solving 
without directly interfering (Sørensen 2006, p. 101). Selective activation involves decisions 
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regarding the composition of the networks, specifically which actors participate and their 
positions in the network (Kickert et al. 1997). An important part of this involves selecting 
participants who have both the ‘right’ resources to address the identified agenda and who are 
willing to devote such resources to the network (Agranoff and McGuire 2001). Finally, 
resourcing concerns the allocation, nature, and use of resources (including material, fiscal and 
legal resources), as well as authority and expertise to the network. Changing these resource 
allocations can act as incentives to promote cooperation or the participation of certain actors 
(Klijn and Koppenjan 2006).  
A second form of meta-governance concerns ‘process management’ (Rhodes 1997), 
which is ‘hands-on’ in the sense that the meta-governor interacts directly with a governance 
network to ensure it functions well (Sørensen 2006). Process management is distinct from 
institutional design in that the main object is to prevent conflict between network actors and 
ensure effective interaction. Successful process management therefore focuses on guiding the 
positive interaction of network actors (Rhodes 1997, p. 74). We delineate two strategies of 
process management. First is that of ‘mediation’ (Kickert et al. 1997), which involves the use 
of an intermediary actor (either within or external to a network) to coordinate transactions 
between other governance actors who lack trust in one another (Gould and Fernandez 1989). 
The second mechanism is ‘facilitation’ (Kickert et al. 1997; Sørensen 2006), the purpose of 
which is to promote favourable, productive interaction within the network (Agranoff and 
McGuire 2001). This commonly involves the establishment of specific conditions and spaces 
that facilitate goal-orientated behaviour, allowing actors to overcome internal distrust and 
handle ongoing conflicts (Haveri et al. 2009). 
In summary, there are six forms of meta-governance that are used to analyse the role 
and impact of private extractive resource companies in affordable housing governance in 
Queensland. These are: (1) institutional structuring; (2) framing; (3) selective activation; (4) 
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resourcing (5) mediation and brokerage; and (6) network facilitation. This conceptualisation 
of the elements of meta-governance and their application to the Queensland case study is 
described in the next section. 
 
3. Research method and introduction to the case study 
Meta-governance is examined here in relation to affordable housing governance in the 
Gladstone-Surat Region
1
 of Queensland, Australia, a largely agricultural area now covering 
the footprint of multiple and overlapping CSG to liquefied natural gas projects (Figure 1). 
Specifically, we focus on the implementation of collaborative governance initiatives 
addressing impacts on affordable rental housing from 2007-2012, a period which saw an 
unprecedented surge in the production and export of commodity resources in Queensland. 
We define affordable housing as ‘privately provided housing that is priced to be affordable to 
households whose income and circumstances constrain their capacity to meet their housing 
needs adequately in the open housing market’ (Lawson et al. 2010, pp. 3-4). This form of 
accommodation is thus distinguished from traditional public housing, which is based on a 
government-centred system with access restricted to those most in need
2
.  
 
<INSERT FIGURE 1> 
Figure 1. Map of case study location in Queensland, Australia. 
Source. Cindy Huchery (2016). 
 
 Data for this research were generated as part of a larger, four-year project related to a 
comparative study of private meta-governance in natural resource management, with 
empirical data collection occurring principally within the 2013-2014 period. For the 
Queensland case component, this involved eighteen semi-structured interviews with State 
government (departments and agencies), local government, community and not-for-profit 
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organisations, and CSG companies operating in the Gladstone-Surat Region. This data was 
triangulated with documentary analysis, which also provided further insight into the nature 
and extent of the interactions between these stakeholders in solving affordable housing 
issues. Participant observation at several workshops and seminars held by a university, in 
partnership with industry, was also undertaken to triangulate the findings and explore more 
deeply the perceptions of industry towards the social challenges associated with the 
development of CSG resources in the Region. Before proceeding to discuss the 
interrelationships between state, local government and private industry in tackling affordable 
housing problems that emerged from the data analysis, it is important to provide a brief 
background on the policy context within which the case study sits.  
In Australia, policy responsibility for the provision of affordable rental housing is 
complex and dispersed across Commonwealth (which is federal or national), state and local 
governments. Since the 1970s, the Commonwealth’s formal involvement in affordable 
housing policy is essentially the distribution of rental assistance funds through 
Commonwealth Rental Assistance (CRA). In 2007, the election of a new Commonwealth 
government was accompanied with the introduction of a suite of new policy measures to 
place housing affordability as a core national priority, including the National Rental 
Affordability Scheme (NRAS). A key element of this reform was the explicit encouragement 
of private and not-for-profit entities to provide affordable housing as a ‘buffer’ against 
ongoing price increases in the private rental market for low-medium income households 
(Gilmour and Milligan 2012). Despite these measures, reports highlighted the 
impracticability of the long-standing CRA programme and the more recent NRAS for 
resource communities, where market rental costs were substantially higher than the levels of 
rental assistance offered to recipients under these programmes (HoRSCR 2013).  
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At the state level, direct efforts to address affordable housing impacts in Queensland 
communities impacted by extractive resource project development were undertaken through 
the Urban Land Development Authority (ULDA), with the establishment of Urban 
Development Areas (UDAs) in both Gladstone and Roma in 2010. The ULDA is a quasi-
governmental agency usually responsible for state land development in metropolitan areas, 
however, the agency was mobilised by the Queensland Government in rural areas to assist in 
meeting housing supply pressures from growth in the resources sector (Morrison et al. 2012). 
In addition to the UDAs, governance mechanisms targeted at addressing the impact of the 
extractive resource projects on rental housing affordability, rather than resulting from the 
Commonwealth government framework for housing policy, instead arose indirectly through 
the strengthening of a social impact assessment function within the assessment process for 
major infrastructure projects in the mining and oil and gas sectors.  
In 2008, the Queensland Office of the Coordinator-General (CG) introduced the 
Sustainable Resource Communities Policy (SRCP) to improve the means by which social and 
cumulative impacts of extractive resource development projects were addressed in 
Queensland. Prior to 2008, consideration of the social impacts of extractive resource 
developments was undertaken as a small component of the assessment of the environmental 
impacts of major project proposals at the approvals stage (Cox et al. 2001)
3
. The policy 
specifically introduced a social impact assessment (SIA) function in state government, and 
outlined the requirement for the development and implementation of Social Impact 
Management Plans (SIMPs)
4
 as a condition of all new or expanded resource projects. As part 
of their project approval, the Coordinator-General legally conditioned all CSG project 
proponents to propose strategies to address impacts on the public interest matter of affordable 
housing. A distinguishing feature of the SIMP commitments, and of interest to this study, was 
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that CSG proponents put forward collaborative strategies to address impacts on affordable 
housing.  
 
4. Results and analysis: the role and functioning of meta-governance  
This section examines the role of all levels of government and of private sector actors in 
managing impacts on housing affordability. The elements of the meta-governance framework 
outlined in Table 1 are used to structure the presentation of findings from the case study of 
affordable housing governance in the Gladstone-Surat Region.  
 
4.1 Institutional structuring 
Prior to 2008, the system of governance for addressing affordable housing issues in 
Queensland communities impacted by extractive resource projects took the form of very 
loosely structured networks involving voluntary not-for-profit organisations, local 
government, and social service-related agencies. There was no clear policy at local, state or 
Comonwealth level as to the coordination of their activities and mining and oil and gas 
companies did not play any significant role in this governance process. The implementation 
of the SRCP and related initiatives by the Queensland Government sought to define a formal 
mode of network governance for tackling the problem specific to resource communities, as 
well as one that incorporated private extractive resource companies as central participants in 
the governance of housing and other cumulative social impacts (see section on ‘Selective 
Activation’). Further, the Queensland Coordinator-General’s Approval Report for the 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) (refer to Endnote 3) stipulated that each proponent 
should produce an ‘integrated housing and accommodation strategy’ as part of the SIMPs for 
their projects. This required companies to: 
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‘…produce and initiate cooperative and coordinated approaches in consultation with 
other major project stakeholders, government agencies and key stakeholders to 
resolve the cumulative housing impacts, with the outcome of achieving joint 
mitigation strategies, and delivery of affordable housing solutions’. (DILGP 2010, 
p. 10).  
 
The organisational structure of the governance network was consequently 
institutionalised through top-down state action. Meta-governance by the state through 
network structuring demonstrated both institutional and strategic purpose. Institutionally, the 
introduced policy and legislative instruments created the ‘political opportunity structure’ 
necessary to spur networked action (Newman et al. 2004, p. 207). Interviewees described this 
intervention by state government as critical given that housing markets in the case-study 
regions had reached crisis level, requiring a coordinated solution. This reflects what Jessop 
(1998, p.19) describes as a major meta-governance role of states, which as the sovereign 
power, are responsible ‘in the last resort for compensatory action where other subsystems 
(e.g. markets) fail’. Strategically, it also served to encourage new institutional arrangements 
and actions to supplement the existing, but somewhat limited, patterns of governance 
operating to address affordable housing issues outside of metropolitan areas. In both cases, 
meta-governance through network structuring saw the state adopt an ‘overview role’ 
(Sørensen 2006, p. 109), with the Office of the Coordinator-General at the time expressing a 
priority to shape the context within which a collaborative governance network is formed, 
rather than leading and initiating specific strategies for management of the issue itself:  
 
(Our) view was not to direct them on exactly how they had to achieve it, but to set 
the legal conditions to ensure that they got it done, but not actually particularly care 
how they did it. (State government interviewee [QLD05]).  
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To (re)structure a network tackling the issues and bring in private actors, state 
government was perceived as the only actor with the mandate to ensure the participation of 
the three CSG companies. Several interviewees indicated it was very unlikely that certain 
companies would have been involved in affordable housing issues had not a regulated 
obligation been placed on them. These insights concur with observations that governance 
networks do not occur merely ‘ad hoc’ (Keast et al. 2014, p. 46), but instead require 
deliberate and purposeful action to institutionalise collaborative and networked action 
(Sørensen and Torfing 2009). In the context of this case study, the state in the form of the 
Office of the Coordinator-General was the only actor to exercise this role.  
 
4.2 Framing 
The policy instruments emanating from the state government also accorded network 
governance involving partnership formation a clear normative status in resolving affordable 
housing impacts, which framed it as the desired mode of governance. As the Coordinator-
General’s Office said: 
 
The (state) government, in partnership with industry and local government, is 
committed to strengthening social impact assessment…(with) the initiatives 
contained in this policy reinforc(ing) the principles of leadership, collaboration, 
corporate responsibility, sustainability, communication and community 
engagement. (DIP 2008, p. 1). 
 
The purported ideal of networked governance and role of the state in advancing this 
was not universally subscribed to by all stakeholders however. One CSG company 
interviewee expressed dissatisfaction with the emphasis on the government steering 
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collaborative processes for reasons of ‘economic freedom’ and the infringement on 
companies’ pursuit of profit by top-down state intervention: 
 
We are talking about an industry where the construction phase is reasonably short, 
and the operations phase is significantly different in terms of impact. The risk with 
getting a government agency in to collaborate or create a collaborative approach is 
you miss (the boat)…your timing gets out of whack. So I am not sure that the 
solution is more collaboration driven by government agency. And is it fair? Because 
overall in Australia we have chosen a free-market system really. The housing 
market operates as a capitalist model. (CSG company interviewee [QLD11]). 
 
State government was cognisant of the complexity of implementing its policies 
merely through coercive and regulatory means, and recognised that there were greater 
prospects for steering development of the collaborative approach with the traction and 
support of the CSG companies. As described by state government interviewees, this required 
the Office of the Coordinator-General to take serious account of the language and internal 
logics surrounding the industry (Jessop 1998, p. 2), and consequently frame the structural and 
strategic framework for collaboration in congruent terms. Consequent meta-governance 
efforts by the state involved appealing to the notion of ‘corporate social responsibility’ and 
using moral suasion to legitimise networked governance: 
 
In terms of collaboration, the method was one of driving collaboration with the 
proponents to convince them that this was in their best interests. That actually if you 
get the local communities on your side, you are going to have a better project 
anyway. So even though we told them that they would be spending many millions 
of dollars on housing for other people, in fact if they were smart, they would 
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actually themselves use this opportunity as part of their campaign about their 
contributing to society. (State government interviewee [QLD05]). 
 
In this way, the use of prescriptive, top-down regulatory tools by the state government 
was mediated through persuasive communication and framing of the issue in an overall 
manner that appealed to corporate rationality not just to get them to spend on housing, but to 
do so in collaboration with others in the industry and in impacted communities. The effect of 
this meta-governance strategy was that it indirectly aligned the conduct of network actors 
with state will, a result that evokes parallels to the notion of ‘action at a distance’ used in the 
work of rural governmentality scholars (e.g. Cheshire 2006). 
 
4.3 Selective activation 
One of the key roles of a meta-governor in a system of network governance is to define and 
incorporate the relevant actors and their interests within the network (Bell and Park 2006). As 
defined by the SIMP Guidelines set by state government, one purpose of the SIMP 
documents was to assign the responsibilities of CSG proponents and other stakeholders in 
managing social impacts. In establishing the concept of a ‘shared responsibility’ between 
proponents, industry and governments to manage the social impacts resulting from project 
development, the documents served to formalise and give long-term legitimacy to networked 
interactions between these actors. Industry interviewees were critical of the implementation 
of this concept in practice, however, asserting that the SIMP documents approved by the 
Office of the Coordinator-General rarely contained acknowledgment of any parties’ 
responsibilities other than their own. The perceived shortcoming of this governance approach 
was that it failed to acknowledge that local housing markets were predominantly a result of 
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‘third-party’ response to company activity, with CSG companies having little ability to 
control the actions of these supply-side actors whether acting alone or in a network. 
 A number of participants consequently alluded to the need for greater statutory 
emphasis on, or recognition of, the responsibilities of other governmental and non-state 
organisations in addressing the problem. Local government, in particular, was emphasised as 
having a range of activities and powers relevant to promoting affordable housing, which 
interviewees perceived as being largely under-utilised: 
 
They (local government) can change the planning schemes, set the rules for the 
configuration and design of new development, decide where development should be 
located….they can even facilitate development happening through imposing 
developer contributions. So in the case of the ULDA, for example, that’s just one 
piece of land. Council have authority over the rest of the town. They could have 
been doing what the ULDA were doing on that piece of land for the rest of the 
town! (State government interviewee [QLD04]). 
 
The failure of local governments to exercise the full extent of their powers for 
promoting affordable housing was perceived as an issue of capacity and knowledge, with 
participants suggesting that local council planners and elected representatives did not 
understand the drivers of housing costs in terms of land availability and planning 
requirements. Other interviewees suggested that state government, via the ULDA, 
consciously bypassed (rather than activated and appropriately resourced) local government, 
leaving it to the ‘conditioned’ CSG companies to consult and develop strategies for 
affordable housing with local government. The mandated inter-organisational ‘linkage’ 
between companies and local government can be understood more fully as a deliberate meta-
governance decision of state government, undertaken to maintain an appearance of ensuring 
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the interests, responsibilities and preferences of local councils were represented in the derived 
solution. Moreover, activation of the ULDA was a parallel state action undertaken outside the 
network to overcome the slow local planning and assessment processes of local government. 
 
4.4 Resourcing 
As a meta-governor, the state government also played a direct role in shaping the exercise of 
network governance by influencing the distribution of resources. Rather than directly 
providing financial resources, the state government sought to leverage funding from the 
private sector for stimulating affordable housing development. This strategy was 
implemented through the powers of the Office of the Coordinator-General which specified 
private spending on housing as a condition of project license approval. In mobilising the 
financial resources of the private sector, some interviewees perceived the size of the financial 
contribution made by companies towards housing as an important yardstick for determining 
project approval. Others described the financial support of companies towards housing as 
serving the interests of the state in its attempt to reduce public discontent: ‘the cynic in me 
would say that the state government was just interested in appeasing the largest complainers 
from the region’ (CSG company interviewee [QLD11]). These findings are consistent with 
Rose’s (1996) profile of advanced liberalism, where state power operates through a range of 
relationships and indirect mechanisms that harness individual energies and resources to meet 
political objectives. However, the issue here is the requirement that the resources be 
channelled through a network rather than allocated directly to appropriate and capable actors.  
 
4.5 Mediation and brokerage 
In Gladstone, following approval of the CSG projects, each of the project proponents initiated 
discussions with the regional council, not-for-profit organisations, and other housing 
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providers in the area for the specific purpose of negotiating strategies to address the approval 
conditions for affordable housing. Participants described these early negotiations as marked 
by widely divergent ideas amongst stakeholders about the role of companies and the extent of 
their involvement in devising an appropriate solution: ‘the companies…they really struggled 
to understand the fact that we were going to make them socially responsible’ (local 
government interviewee [QLD10]).  For affordable housing in Gladstone, to resolve the 
disagreement, and assist in the achievement of an agreed strategy and common goal that 
characterises network governance, the Office of the Coordinator-General assumed a 
brokerage role and sought to bring together the three CSG companies for collective 
discussion with the local council, community housing providers and other stakeholders: 
 
We were very much at the centre of organising that meeting and pulling those 
companies together.  We basically got them all in a room together with the council 
and with all the key players and said bluntly, ‘we need to work together on this 
issue, if you all independently go away and decide you're going to do something 
around housing, we can't be sure that those outcomes will be the ones that we want’. 
(State government interviewee [QLD03]).   
 
By explicitly connecting the multiple actors into one collective arena and mediating 
the consequent interactions and negotiations, state government was able to change the 
companies’ view on the interaction process and shift their preferences towards an outcome of 
joint contribution: 
 
It was a bit of a first because companies are not always comfortable about working 
together. We really emphasised the need for collaboration given the intensity of the 
cumulative impact on housing in Gladstone. So the three companies went away 
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from that meeting and discussed this amongst themselves. And they came back with 
an agreeance that they would jointly put funds in together. (State government 
interviewee [QLD03]).   
 
Gladstone Council consequently used the financial contribution of the CSG 
proponents to create an independent private (not-for-profit) affordable housing company, 
Gladstone Affordable Housing (GAH).  
 
4.6 Network facilitation 
Individual CSG companies undertook a network ‘facilitation’ role (Sørensen 2006, p. 102) on 
several occasions. As a meta-governance task, this involved initiating new interactions with 
actors who held the potential information, resources or ideas to contribute to the development 
of affordable housing solutions. For example, in the formation of the GAH, Company A 
performed a key facilitative role by establishing a joint steering committee to guide project 
decision-making. This meta-governance action, while necessary to sustain the relationships of 
key actors involved in the initiative, presented a potential cause of tension regarding a single 
private actor’s involvement in the facilitation of inter-organisational collaboration at the 
management level:  
 
The steering committee I originally set it up and was responsible for running it. But 
at one of the committee meetings I said, ‘OK, I think we now need to transition the 
running of this group over to council because we are in a strategic alliance here, but 
at the end of the day, I can’t be seen to be dictating terms to our competitors’. (CSG 
company interviewee [QLD13]). 
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This statement demonstrates that the conflictual and competitive relationship 
conventionally held between private organisations is difficult to overcome even in network 
governance settings, and points to a potential reason for the state nearly always being 
theorised as the default meta-governor. Meta-governance by network facilitation was 
demonstrated also in the broader Region, with CSG companies having established working 
groups early during the EIS process to facilitate company-community interaction around 
major issues including housing. Interviewees noted one working group as being particularly 
unique at the time as it had involved the joint participation of two proponents: 
 
In the early days I remember [Company A] tried to put together a bit of a housing 
affordability working group in Roma, where we attended very happily. And nothing 
really came out of in terms of initiatives, other than us attending and having a good 
discussion. But it is one example of where the two companies could sit together 
with the industry and local government on the same table and debate what was to be 
done about it. (CSG company interviewee [QLD11]). 
 
Despite this example, interviewees described competition between companies and indicated 
that the same appetite for collaboration between the CSG companies that had emerged in 
Gladstone was unfortunately not as apparent in the broader Region – in particular, the 
Western Downs. Rather, governance of affordable housing involved the two dominant 
proponents competing to secure their own co-existing but separate strategies in partnership 
with key stakeholders. Company B chose to address its affordable housing requirements 
through a once-off financial donation to a housing trust proposed by the Western Downs 
Regional Council. Company C, in contrast, was not involved in the Council model, instead 
forming a partnership with a (private) not-for-profit affordable housing provider to develop 
accommodation on land made available by the state government. It also initiated partnerships 
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with several local community housing providers, providing funding, human resources and 
administrative space to support the delivery of housing and rental support programmes under 
these organisations.  
 A key barrier to the involvement of Company C in the council proposed housing trust 
was the perception that the initiative was overly focused on leveraging the opportunity for 
local council to benefit from involvement in affordable housing development, at the expense 
of adequately managing immediate impacts. Company C was in particular wary of the ability 
of local council to successfully perform the leadership role demanded of them by the Trust 
initiative in a timely and efficient manner: 
 
Some people in Council thought we would be better off giving them all our money 
and let them deal with the problem. That view was quite prevalent in Council. I 
thought, if we go with the council option, we can give them all our money and, yes, 
we can probably tick the box for compliance, but unfortunately, because of their 
lack of capability and because of a lack of a robust business case, there was no way 
they were going to build anything that at the time was needed. (CSG company 
interviewee [QLD11]).  
 
Thus the perceived timing, delivery and reputational risks associated with partnering 
with Local Council led Company C to revert back to market mechanisms.  
 
5. Discussion 
5.1 Coordination in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ 
This paper set out to conceptualise the role of state and private meta-governance in multi-
sectoral arrangements addressing affordable housing inequalities in extractive resource 
regions (Figure 2). The topic of affordable housing is unique in that extractive resource 
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companies are private corporations, and, beyond their own workforce, they have not 
traditionally played a role in human services and infrastructure provision, with this function 
primarily understood as a responsibility of government.  
 
<INSERT FIGURE 2> 
Figure 2. Meta-governance strategies observed in the case study. 
 
A first finding from our research, therefore, is that local mobilisation of ‘for-profit’ 
extractive resource companies in governance activities for social purposes (e.g. affordable 
housing provision) can result if supported through vertical relations of governance, or ‘meta-
governance’. Indeed, affordable housing governance in the Gladstone-Surat Region was 
principally coordinated and influenced ‘at a distance’ by the public sector, notably the 
Queensland Coordinator-General’s Office. The formal authority of government was used by 
this agency as a point of leverage to shape and influence the structure of the boundaries, as 
well as the agendas and desired outcomes, of the governance network responding to 
affordable housing impacts. For example, the establishment of new state policy (i.e. the 
SRCP) and the associated mandating of SIMPs was used to involve CSG companies in 
developing collaborative solutions to affordable housing impacts. In doing so, state 
government selectively chose the companies as the lead agencies to coordinate a solution, 
while also stipulating aspects of their interaction with other actors (i.e. mandated consultation 
with local government). Involvement of the private sector in affordable housing governance 
was produced in part by a mentality of collaborative-networked governance, but also as a 
result of increasing political pressure on state government to publicly hold the extractive 
resource industry accountable for its (growing) impacts on communities. For this purpose, it 
was necessary for state government to employ a ‘framing strategy’ to overcome some 
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resistance by private industry regarding their performance of what they perceived as a ‘public 
agency role’ via co-governance.   
 
5.2 Private meta-governance support for synergistic interactions 
A second finding identified within this paper was that the exercise of meta-governance was 
not limited to the realm of the public sector. While state government was shown to play a 
lead role in establishing the ‘political opportunity structures’ necessary to develop and 
promote collaboration, CSG companies – once accepting of the idea of collaboration - 
undertook a local facilitative role by stimulating and linking specific actors as well as 
promoting the conditions necessary for positive and constructive interaction. All CSG 
companies were shown to exercise meta-governance by their role in enacting and facilitating 
local ‘arenas’ for stakeholder discussion and decision-making through the establishment and 
resourcing of working groups and multi-stakeholder forums pertaining to affordable housing 
issues. These spaces served as a means to link and explicitly connect actors who held the 
potential information, resources, capacity or ideas to contribute to the development of 
affordable housing solutions. They also served as a space for the development of trust and 
consensus-building interaction between stakeholders. In this respect, CSG companies 
demonstrated what Edelenbos et al. (2013) describe as a ‘driver’ role, as they were constantly 
mentioned by interviewees as being directly responsible for identifying points of connection 
with other stakeholders and making synergistic connections in seeking to formulate potential 
affordable housing initiatives. 
 
5.3 Limitations of private meta-governance 
While private meta-governance can bring various parties together, a third finding of this 
paper relates to the ability of the CSG companies to sustain this process management (meta-
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
Original Article                                                                 Sociologia Ruralis 0(0) 
24 
 
governance) role given the competitive element of their relations with other firms. One clear 
example was that of Gladstone, where the interactive lead taken by one company in building 
and maintaining a collaborative forum was unable to be sustained due to the competitive 
tensions created by what was essentially seen as one company steering the decisions of 
another company. In this regard, unlike state government, private companies do not have the 
formal ability to compel participation in governance networks from other actors with 
cooperative undertakings (O’Toole 1997, p. 445). This points to a reason why government is 
almost always considered the most appropriate actor for a meta-governance role (Bell and 
Hindmoor 2009).  
Decisions made by private companies to engage in and facilitate certain synergies 
were also underpinned by rational, self-interested purposes, which led extractive resource 
companies to hold some reservations about taking on a meta-governing role. For example, in 
the broader Region, rather than enter into an existing network based on a Council proposed 
initiative, Company C alternatively initiated a host of new initiatives with not-for-profit 
organisations. This decision stemmed from a number of sources of uncertainty about the 
network, including efficiency and quality concerns, and also in preference to trying to meta-
govern a network. What resulted was a return by the company to market governance where 
the relationship with the partner not-for-profit organisations was organised according to 
contracts and perceived as a more efficient arrangement for the delivery of affordable 
housing. This specific example highlights the important need for facilitators in stabilising 
both interactions and expectations among actors, and the implications for inter-organisational 
effort in the absence of such a role. In this vein, there was strong accord amongst both 
government and non-government interviewees concerning the need for local government to 
have a greater mediation role, as has been proven viable elsewhere (Barnett 2011). In what 
can be seen as broadly characteristic of local government in rural areas (Cheshire et al. 2014), 
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this leadership potential was largely perceived as being constrained by limitations in both 
Council’s knowledge (i.e. of market processes), and their capacity to mobilise and coordinate 
disparate actors in a manner that could keep pace with market demand.  
 
5.4 Affordable housing governance through urban-rural interdependence  
As a final point, the dynamics of the case study examined in this paper highlight how meta-
governance in rural regions is not just about coordinating and mobilising horizontal 
cooperation, but about coalescing action within wider ‘exogenous’ networks and structures 
(Bosworth et al. 2016). Where previously the housing and social service activities of local 
government and not-for-profit agencies in the rural region were financed by state grants, the 
mobilisation of private financial resources by the state-led partnerships for offsetting impacts 
to housing became centred on the distribution of the CSG company money. The leveraging of 
the these private financial resources functioned to incentivise and consequently introduce a 
number of new ‘urban’ actors to the housing network of the rural region, including two major 
not-for profit-housing developers, in addition to a quasi-government land authority body, 
both of which were based traditionally in the major urban area of South-East Queensland. 
The impact of increased resource flows (organisational, skills, financial) from urban to rural 
areas was shown to result in new ways of working as well as more innovative solutions for 
affordable housing provision, with such process of counter-urbanisation serving to 
‘regionalise’ (at least temporarily) the rural affordable housing programme (Murdoch 2006, 
p.180), which was previously extremely limited and localised. However, the partnership 
established between one of the urban not-for-profit affordable housing providers and 
extractive resource companies (in lieu of collaborative engagement with local actors) was 
criticised heavily by local authorities who felt the partnership risked losing sight of the 
specific rural needs of the community, and local ownership (and thus acceptance of) the final 
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housing solutions delivered. Other interviewees felt that the state’s decision to involve private 
actors (both companies and urban developers) in regional affordable housing governance was 
intended not just to leverage private investment, but also to evade local government political 
control. In the case at hand, hybrid governance arrangements integrated both relational and 
territorial political aspects, indicating that future application of rural-urban partnerships for 
housing delivery in rural extractive resource regions will require greater meta-governance 
oversight to ensure that such interactions are ‘increasingly symmetrical rather than 
asymmetrical’ (Lichter and Brown 2011, p. 567).  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have conceptualized the governance of housing inequality in resource-
dependent regions as the product of networked relations between rural and urban actors. Far 
from being ad-hoc, both state and private actors play a ‘higher-order’ role in structuring and 
steering the direction and interaction of these relations. We drew on the public administration 
notion of ‘meta-governance’ to develop a conceptual framework to understand the strategies 
used by these actors to promote and facilitate particular forms of network governance. To that 
end, a significant common emphasis of this literature is that meta-governance is about 
improving the positive functioning of self-governing networks. In the Gladstone-Surat 
Region, state government indeed leveraged networked arrangements to manage impacts of 
the resources boom on affordable housing. However, our analysis reveals a more political 
purpose and understanding of meta-governance, whereby state meta-governance decisions 
concerning the involvement of certain actors and the distribution of resources within this 
network were undertaken in the service of their own interests (i.e. to leverage private 
investment and evade local government political control). CSG companies similarly engaged 
in process management forms of meta-governance when it became apparent that facilitating 
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collaborative action had potential to secure and maintain a ‘social licence to operate’ (Bice 
and Moffat, 2014). This suggests that meta-governance can provide state and private actors 
with ‘pragmatic’ and ‘framing’ power over seemingly collaborative and shared modes of 
governance (Morrison et al. 2017). We consequently caution that there may be misleading 
appearances of shared power in increasingly adopted ‘hybrid’ governance in rural areas that 
may not serve to address inequalities unless well-resourced actors in the state and private 
sector can benefit. 
The paper has also highlighted how central state meta-governance contributed to a 
wider participation of organisations (and their resources) from urban areas. The resulting 
‘exogenous’ governance arrangements for affordable housing delivery were accordingly 
much more differentiated and better resourced than previous ‘endogenous’ housing delivery 
partnerships solely between local actors (Gkartzios and Scott, 2014). While we suggest that 
urban–rural approaches to housing delivery in extractive resource regions offers exciting 
opportunities for future regional development, with benefits to both urban and rural areas, it 
remains to be seen how - and by whom - the tensions and interests between these spatially 
different actors will be resolved. This is an area for future meta-governance research in 
studies examining social policy around rural inequalities. 
 
Footnotes 
1
 The region is comprised of three rural local government areas: Gladstone, Western Downs 
and Maranoa. Intensive ‘upstream’ CSG resource exploration and processing activities, such 
as drilling, extracting, processing and compressing are located in the Western Downs and 
Maranoa. Communities within these areas, such as Miles, Chinchilla and Roma, combine the 
servicing of traditional agricultural enterprises with new energy resource development 
activities. ‘Downstream’ activities associated with CSG production, including gas processing, 
liquefaction and shipping, are concentrated in Gladstone. More than 5000 km of transmission 
pipelines connect producing gasfields to Gladstone and other markets, notably urban South-
East Queensland. 
 
2
 The term ‘public housing’ is used interchangeably with ‘social housing’. The latter, 
however, is an umbrella term that encompasses all forms of sub-market housing provided to 
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low-to-moderate income persons, including public housing and affordable housing (Lawson 
et al., 2010). 
 
3
 In Queensland, if a major project proposal is deemed likely to have a ‘significant’ impact on 
the environment, the proponent is required by law to prepare an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS). An EIS is a document that describes the potential impact of a development 
on the environment and proposed ways of mitigating these impacts. The purpose of an EIS is 
to assist the relevant decision-maker in their decision to approve a proposed development. 
 
4
 SIMPs are standalone documents in that they are separate to the EIS document. SIMPs 
outlined agreed strategies for mitigating the effects of impacts identified through the SIA 
process, and the responsibility of various parties in relation to the strategies. 
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Table 1. Six forms of meta-governance explored in the case study. 
Dimension Strategies Examples 
Institutional design  Institutional 
Structuring 
Strategies aimed at influencing the 
context, or ‘arena’, in which 
games (interaction processes) 
take place. 
 Establishing participants’ roles; operating rules, 
objectives, and the norms of the network. The 
resultant strategies shape the character of the policy 
network as a whole. 
 Framing Strategies shaping the perceptions 
of actors regarding the nature and 
purpose of the network. 
 Setting agendas and defining key terms used in 
debate and decision making: 
o rhetoric of collaboration 
o policy campaigns. 
 Selective 
activation 
Decisions regarding actors; who 
participates, their positions. 
 Adding new actors to or removing existing actors 
from a network. 
 Re-arranging and shifting the position of actors 
within network structures. 
 Resourcing Allocation, nature, control, and use 
of resources (material, fiscal, 
legal, authoritative, information, 
knowledge). 
 Establishing incentives to promote cooperation or 
competition, or the participation of actors: 
o economic instruments—subsidies, CSR 
donations or funding, sponsorship 
o informational instruments guidelines, brochures, 
campaigns, and studies. 
Process 
management 
Mediation The flow or exchange 
 of resources from one actor to 
another via an intermediary.  
 The use of an intermediary actor to liase between 
other governance actors who lack trust  in one 
another. 
 Facilitation Providing specific conditions and 
spaces that facilitate goal-
orientated activities to occur. 
 Arranging interaction through the establishment of 
‘nodes’ or temporary arrangements to facilitate the 
development of consensus-building interaction: 
o general meetings, forums, workshops, council 
chamber meeting, reference groups, action 
groups, consultation group. 
Note. CSR = Corporate Social Responsibility. 
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Figure 1. Map of case study location in Queensland, Australia. 
Source. Cindy Huchery (2016). 
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Figure 2: Meta-governance strategies observed in the case study. 
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